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CAP Reform and the Re-balancing of Support for Cereals and Oilseeds: A Farm Level 
Analysis 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper assesses the impact of current market conditions and Agenda 2000 
CAP reforms, particularly the ‘rebalancing’ of support between cereals and 
oilseed crops, on crop gross margins and hence on the incentive to produce 
oilseed rape on three representative farm types in eastern England. Results 
indicate that under a conventional rotation, oilseed rape area falls 
substantially on two of the farm types considered. However, the incentive to 
plant break crops more frequently increases after the reform; under a two-
break crop rotation, oilseed rape area remains at pre-reform levels. Oilseed 
rape prices of circa £100 per tonne, particularly when combined with 
unrestricted set-aside rates, conventional rotations and low cereal prices, 
would give farmers in eastern England substantial incentives to reduce the 
area of the crop grown. 
 
Keywords: Agenda 2000, rebalancing, oilseed rape, mixed-integer programming model, crop 
rotation. 
JEL classification:  Q12, Q18 
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1. Introduction 
 
In March 1999 the European Union (EU) agreed a package of reforms to the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) as part of the Agenda 2000 programme. Although the reforms 
were motivated by the need to prepare the EU for enlargement, they are also expected to 
enhance the negotiating position of the EU in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
Millennium Round. As part of the reform package, it was agreed that the level of direct 
payments for oilseeds production should be cut to fall in line with those for cereals. This was 
done to remove a constraint on EU oilseeds area imposed as part of the URA. However, 
given the lower margins available on oilseeds production, it is believed such ‘re-balancing’ of 
support could have an impact on cropping decisions, with farmers switching from oilseeds to 
cereal crops. HGCA (1999a) suggest that producers in the UK will reduce the area of oilseed 
rape (Brassica napus), the main UK oilseed crop. 
 
To consider this hypothesis further, ‘Farm-adapt’, a farm-level, mixed integer-programming 
(MIP) model is used in this paper to examine the impact of the arable sector reforms on three 
types of farm growing oilseed rape in the East Anglia region of England. The model has been 
developed to capture the complexity of the farm situation, particularly the constraints 
imposed by crop rotations. Integer programming allows us to assess whether the reforms 
provide an incentive for farmers to reduce labour and machinery inputs. The extent to which 
these reductions are possible is linked to the availability of set-aside: the paper also 
investigates whether the impact on farm income of a fall in crop margins can be offset by 
increasing the area of land set aside and reducing labour and machinery levels. The Agenda 
2000 reforms require compulsory set-aside to be 10 per cent of the area on which direct 
payments are claimed; however “Producers may be granted the set-aside payment on land 
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voluntarily set aside in excess of their obligation” (European Communities, 1999a). A 
combined voluntary set-aside, labour/machinery-reduction farm plan, if adopted by sufficient 
farmers, could have a significant impact on the area of oilseed rape grown in the UK. Note 
that while it is possible to grow industrial or “non-food” oilseed rape in the UK, this paper 
only considers rape produced for human or animal consumption, grown on conventional (i.e. 
not set-aside) land. 
 
The paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 explains the policy background to rebalancing of 
support for oilseeds and cereals and the adoption of the Agenda 2000 reforms. Section 3 
discusses the selection of appropriate farm types for modelling the impact of reform; Section 
4 the calculation of pre- and post-reform enterprise gross margins. Sections 5 and 6 
respectively provide an overview of and results from the Farm-adapt model; Section 7 
concludes. 
 
2. The reforms - an overview 
The 1999 CAP reforms focused on three key sectors - arable, beef and dairy. In all three, the 
shift from price support to direct payments, a feature of the 1992 reforms, has been 
continued. Cereal support prices have been cut by 15 per cent, although in contrast to the 
1992 reforms the direct payments offset only 50 per cent of this cut, rather than 100 per cent. 
The aim was partly to limit budget costs and partly to avoid the ‘over-compensation’ that 
occurred after 1992, when farmers received a fixed level of compensation on top of 
exceptionally high market prices. Compensation increases from £54 to £63 per ton1 over the 
                                                 
1 Metric tons are used throughout this paper. In the calculations presented below, we use the currency 
conversion rate Euro 1= £0.629, which prevailed in mid-2000. 
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two-year transition period; in England, this results in a cereal area payment of €371 per 
hectare, at the historic regional yield of 5.89 tons per hectare. In addition to the changes to 
cereal support, support for oilseeds will be ‘re-balanced’, so that existing direct payments for 
oilseeds will be reduced to the same level as cereals. Oilseeds are thus brought within the 
cereals regime and no longer receive an oilseed-specific payment. Protein crop payments also 
fall, but with a premium (€9.5 per ton; €55.96 per hectare) over that paid for cereals and 
oilseeds. 
 
This re-balancing is explicitly linked to a bilateral deal on oilseeds made with the US in 1993 
in order to facilitate the Uruguay Round Agreement (URA). Under the Blair House Accord, 
the EU agreed to limit the support granted to oilseed producers. The limit took the form of a 
Maximum Guaranteed Area of 5.482 million hectares less set-aside of at least 10 per cent. 
Plantings beyond this result in a financial penalty in the current year and a reduction in 
guaranteed area the following year. However, re-balancing means that: 
 
For oilseeds, this non-specific payment eliminates the basic condition for 
production area constraints imposed by the Blair House agreement and 
enables the EU to abrogate all specific oilseeds provisions (European 
Commission, 1998: 9). 
 
A feature of the reform was that two agreements were reached, the first by the Council of 
Agricultural Ministers in mid March 1999, the second by the European Council two weeks 
later in Berlin. This adjustment was motivated ostensibly by the need to reduce CAP 
spending by the 2 per cent required to bring projected budget outlays within the previously-
agreed ‘stabilised’ limit for the period 2000-2006 (for a detailed analysis, see Ackrill, 2000a; 
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2000b). The main changes in the second agreement were made to arable support. By agreeing 
a smaller price cut for cereals (15 per cent as compared with 20 per cent), not only was there 
a smaller rise in the direct payment for cereals, but re-balancing therefore meant a larger cut 
in oilseed payments. 
 
A further consequence was that the smaller price cut was less likely to remove price support 
and the need for export refunds. Set-aside has therefore had to be retained, at 10 per cent (the 
first agreement kept the option of set-aside, but the rate was normally to be set at zero).2 With 
the constraint on subsidised cereal exports under the URA remaining effective, set-aside is 
needed to contain demand for intervention and the attendant budgetary consequences, which 
will increase if producers switch from oilseeds to cereals production. 
 
The impact of the changes outlined above is complicated by the UK’s decision not to adopt 
the euro. The rise of sterling against the euro since 1999 has meant lower direct payments and 
intervention prices for UK farmers; these exchange rate effects are included in our post-
reform analysis. 
 
3. Regional production of oilseed rape in the UK and choice of farm types 
After France and Germany, the UK is the third largest producer of oilseed rape in the EU. 
The majority of the crop is grown in the drier, lower-lying eastern part of England, where it is 
an important part of arable rotations on farms growing combinable crops (Table 1). These 
farms are often associated with heavier, clay-based soil types, which are less suitable for 
growing the higher value root crops, potatoes and sugar beet.  
Table 1 here  
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Table 2 shows the percentage area of oilseed rape on farms in the East Anglia region of the 
UK’s Farm Business Survey, results from which are supplied to the European Farm 
Accountancy Data Network. Within this region, there is a marked variation in distribution of 
the crop, with the lighter soils of the north supporting much lower levels of oilseed rape than 
the clay and chalk-based soils of the south. Cambridgeshire and Hertfordshire are the core 
oilseed rape-growing areas, with limited opportunities for alternative enterprises. The north 
and south Essex regions have similar characteristics, but with a greater proportion of 
livestock farming. Of the oilseed rape-growing areas, central Suffolk has the greatest 
potential for alternative enterprises, the loam-based soil giving a greater proportion of root 
crops (mainly sugar beet), as well as supporting livestock production. 
Table 2 here  
These three regions provide a basis for modelling the impact of Agenda 2000 on oilseed rape 
production: they cover the main rape-producing areas of East Anglia and reflect different 
degrees of flexibility for adaptation, depending on soil type and location. We use the west 
Cambridgeshire region to represent farms that are limited in their choice of enterprise mix to 
combinable crops only, north Essex to represent farms that can change their mix of 
combinable crops and livestock and central Suffolk to represent farms that can adapt by 
changing combinable crop, livestock and root crop mix. Restricting the analysis to East 
Anglia is not entirely satisfactory - as shown in Table 1, the East Midlands region has a 
greater area of oilseed rape. However, the data required, particularly the breakdown of output 
into enterprise gross margins, are only available for the East Anglia region. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
2 See Ackrill, 2000b for a discussion of world price forecasts and the likely need for export refunds. 
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4. Enterprise gross margins 
Enterprise gross margin is defined as the annual output value of an enterprise, plus direct 
payments, minus the associated variable costs of production. Our objective in modelling the 
Agenda 2000 agreement is to compare farm plans that were appropriate under conditions 
typical of the period of ‘over-compensation’, referred to in section 2, with those that are 
appropriate for conditions post-Agenda 2000. Therefore, pre-reform crop gross margins, in 
real terms, for each region were taken from the Farm Business Survey covering East Anglia 
(Murphy, 1998, 1999; Lang, 2000). Three years of data (relating to harvest years 1996-1998) 
were used to average out seasonal effects (Table 3).3 A beef enterprise was also included as 
an alternative to field crops. However, beef gross margins for the north Essex and central 
Suffolk farms are not available by region and represent a range of different production 
systems with differing outputs and input requirements. Therefore beef gross margin was 
modelled using Farm-adapt, which assumes an ‘18-month system’, with male calves bought 
at age 3 months and culled for sale at 18 months. Farm-adapt determines the optimal 
combination of forage and cereal-based feed for a given weight of animal at culling; forage 
production (hay or silage) requires labour and machinery (contract or owned) for fertilising 
and cutting of grass. Beef variable costs not determined by the model (veterinary and bedding 
costs) are taken from Nix (1996), as are fertiliser, feed, animal sale and purchase prices and 
headage payments. The latter are limited by sex (male animals only), a stocking rate of 2 
livestock units per forage hectare and the number of claims per producer (maximum 90 per 
year). 
 
                                                 
3 Arguably a longer time period should have been used, however large farms (> 400 hectares) were excluded 
from the Survey results in the 1995-96 crop year, but included subsequently. 
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Post-reform crop gross margins were calculated using values for intervention prices and 
direct payments applicable in the 2002/2003 marketing year (i.e. after the Agenda 2000 
transition period). An exchange rate of £0.629 to the euro, current in mid-2000, was used in 
all calculations. Crop yields for the 2002 harvest are linear trend projections for each region, 
based on 15 years of data (1984-1998). Variable costs are assumed to remain unchanged for 
all crops; prices for sugar beet and potatoes on the central Suffolk farm are also assumed to 
remain at pre-reform levels. For beef, Agenda 2000 also redirects support away from end-
product prices: the intervention price falls by 20 per cent and farmers are compensated 
directly in the form of increased headage payments and a new ‘slaughter premium’, paid on 
each eligible male animal. It was assumed that beef sale prices fall by 20 per cent from the 
pre-reform level and that cereal-based feed prices fall by 15 per cent, in line with the fall in 
the cereal intervention price. 
 
As there is no price support for oilseed rape and protein crops pre- or post-reform, it is 
initially assumed that prices for these crops continue at the levels prevailing in the pre-reform 
period (i.e. oilseed rape price is independent of cereal price). Sensitivity analysis is used to 
assess the impact of falling oilseed rape price on crop mix and farm profitability. 
 
The assumption that cereal prices fall to the 2002 intervention price can be criticised: low 
cereal prices reflect current (2000) market conditions and exchange rate disparities, not just 
the Agenda 2000 reform. However, the complementary nature of oilseed area (or other break 
crops such as legumes) with first winter wheat means that cereal price changes may affect 
farm net margin but are less likely to affect crop mix. However, we explicitly address the 
impact of variation in cereal prices by conducting further sensitivity analysis for the North 
Essex farm type. 
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Tables 3 pre- and post-reform gross margins 
 
5. A farm level model 
A full, algebraic description of the model, which contains both arable and livestock 
components, is given in Ramsden et al. (2000). The model is designed to capture the 
complexity of UK farming systems, which are typically characterised by: 
1. a wide choice of available enterprises  
2. the complementary nature of some of these enterprises e.g. break crops and cereal crops 
3. as a consequence of 1., the competition for labour and machinery that occurs between 
different enterprises at different times of the year 
4. the differing and often overlapping time periods available for optimal and sub-optimal 
establishment and harvesting of crops 
5. substitution effects, particularly the substitution of contract machinery and labour for 
farmer-owned machinery and hired labour. 
 
Figure 1 shows in schematic form how these features are incorporated into the model. There 
are two types of skilled labour available, the farmer and full-time labourers who supply 
‘ordinary’ and ‘overtime’ labour hours; both these categories are adjusted for social (normal 
working week, illness) and seasonal (soil workability) factors. Additionally, casual and 
contract labour can be supplied, up to pre-specified limits; contract labour is supplied with 
machinery. These five items make up the total weekly labour supply, in hours, available to 
the farm. Skilled labour is needed to operate machines; these, together with any contracted 
machines and machines not requiring an operator, make up the total machines on the farm. 
Full-time labour and owned machinery are costed as full employer costs and annual 
ownership costs (depreciation, maintenance, interest, tax and insurance) respectively. Fuel 
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and oil costs vary with the amount of machine (tractors and combines) use. Contract work is 
limited to the field time that can be supplied by one contractor for each operation (e.g. 
combining, ploughing) per week.  
 
(Approximate position of Figure 1) 
 
Jointly, labour and machinery supply field time: the weekly hours available at different times 
of the year for field operations. There must be sufficient machines (with field equipment in 
the case of tractors) and labour to meet field operation requirements (i.e. the workrate 
coefficients): for example, the model cannot draw on additional casual labour if there is 
insufficient machinery capacity to utilise this additional labour. The time-frame available for 
different operations corresponds to normal conditions in the south-eastern half of Britain 
(Nix, 1996); crop operational requirements cannot be met from field time weeks outside these 
boundaries. The model can select between average and premium workrates for labour and 
machinery operations. Following Nix (1998), premium workrates require larger field sizes 
(minimum 8 hectares), farm size (minimum 200 hectares) and tractors (minimum 75 kW) and 
associated equipment. Tractors and equipment associated with premium workrates incur 
larger annual ownership costs. Transfer variables ensure that surplus field time labour can be 
used for indoor tasks (barn labour and animal labour) and that there is a distinction between 
indoor and outdoor tasks, with the time-frames for the latter being determined by seasonal 
and social factors and the former being determined only by social factors.  
 
Total land is assumed to be of equal quality: only rotational restrictions limit the area of 
crops (including set-aside) and grass that can be grown. In the case of wheat, the crop is 
divided into first, second and third-crop winter wheat, depending on the crop grown 
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previously in the rotation (see below). Crops and grass generate output, either through being 
processed by animals (grass and forage crops) or directly through farm-gate sales.  
 
A section of a model input file is shown in Figure 1 to demonstrate the field times, time-
frames and workrates for a selection of crops and operations during spring. Weekly available 
ordinary and overtime hours supplied by one full-time worker increase from 35.2 to 41.2 
hours as soil workability increases; together these give the maximum field time available 
from this worker (with appropriate machinery). The winter wheat and winter barley time-
frame for applying fertiliser starts in week 9 and continues beyond the section shown; the 
workrate for winter wheat is greater than for winter barley because of the greater number of 
fertiliser applications (three rather than two). The cultivation time-frame for spring peas ends 
in week 10; cultivation, drilling and application of fertiliser on spring barley take place 
within weeks 9-13. Competition for labour and machinery (tractors, cultivators and fertiliser 
spreaders) is greatest in week 10, where all 6 crop and field operation combinations overlap. 
 
 
 
Rotations 
A crop rotation is a sequence of crops that is repeated after a certain interval of time. The 
length of the rotation is determined by the crops grown on the farm. In the UK, farmers 
growing potatoes are recommended to grow the crop on the same land only once every four 
or five years; oilseed rape is recommended to be grown no more than once every four years 
(Soffe, 1995). The delay in repeat planting prevents the build-up of soil-borne diseases. The 
implication of a four-year rotation – assuming that producers are risk averse and wish to 
diversify – is that the maximum area of the break crop in each year is 25 per cent of the 
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arable area of the farm. However, there is evidence to show that farmers are not following 
recommended practices, particularly with respect to oilseed rape. For example, in the 1996 
harvest year, 49 out of the 62 farms in the East Midlands Farm Business Survey ‘mainly 
cereals’ category grew oilseed rape; 10 of these farms had oilseed rape areas greater than 25 
per cent of total combinable crop area, the maximum being 38 per cent, suggesting more 
frequent cropping than one year in four. Farmers in other EU countries are also growing 
break crops more frequently: for example, it has been estimated that 11 per cent of the 
sunflower crop in France is planted immediately after a preceding crop of sunflowers 
(European Commission, 1999). Specifying fixed rotations in farm-level models has been 
criticised as being overly restrictive (Jacobsen et al., 1998), particularly as it can prevent 
transition from one rotational sequence to another, a possible adaptation response to price- or 
policy-induced change. Therefore, a flexible approach to modelling rotations is required to 
adequately capture the impact of Agenda 2000 policy and market conditions on oilseed rape 
production. 
In the standard model, a four-year gap is maintained between break crops, under the 
assumption that this is the minimum acceptable agronomic practice. Break crops are non-
cereal crops, such as beans, peas and oilseed rape that provide a yield benefit to cereal crops 
(winter wheat) that follow in the rotation. The model contains four ‘blocks’ of land, A,B,C, 
and D, each equal to 25 per cent of the total farm area. Crop areas cannot exceed the 
available land in each block and sequencing constraints ensure that certain crops can only be 
grown in combination with other crops. This applies to ‘first’ winter wheat (WW1), which in 
practice can only be planted on land on which a break crop was planted previously. For 
example, on a 100 hectare farm, if the model allocates 20 hectares of block A to winter beans 
and 5 hectares to winter barley, up to 20 hectares of WW1 can be grown in block B. 
Following Bacon et al. (1998), wheat following other cereals (second winter wheat, WW2) is 
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assumed to yield 15 per cent less than WW1; third winter wheat (WW3) is assumed to yield 
15 per cent less than WW2. WW1 can follow any break crop or rotational set-aside land. 
WW2 can follow WW1 and any non-cereal but not itself; WW3 can follow WW2 or itself. 
Therefore, the model can, for example, choose a continuous rotation of winter wheat by 
allocating all blocks to WW3. Other cereals can enter at any stage of the rotation. Thus, the 
model does not restrict cropping to a fixed four-year rotation: a number of different rotations 
can be chosen, subject only to the sequencing constraints noted above. 
 
As already mentioned, some UK farmers grow break crops more frequently than once every 
four years despite agronomic advice to the contrary. This allows the area of first winter wheat 
to be increased and may also be a result of the area payment policy: the financial 
consequences of diseases caused by repeated growing of one crop are reduced, as a smaller 
proportion of revenue accrues from the crop itself. Thus, a second rotation is specified in 
which two break crops are allowed. This allows the model to put up to 50 per cent of the 
available land into oilseed rape, spring peas, winter beans or (within the constraints outlined 
below) rotational set-aside, or some combination of these crops. We calculate the incentive to 
adjust to the two-break rotation by comparing the profitability of the two rotations under pre- 
and post-reform conditions. 
 
 
Further differences between farm types 
For combinable crops, storage is assumed not to be a constraint. Expansion of potato area 
requires additional investment in storage (and machinery) facilities. Livestock housing in the 
north Essex and central Suffolk regions is initially assumed to be adequate to house the 
average beef or sheep herd for the whole survey region, additional livestock housing can be 
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purchased if profitable. Sugar beet is assumed not to require storage facilities (much of the 
crop is stored outdoors in ‘clamps’). Worktime availability for the heavier clay soil regions is 
reduced by 33 per cent in March, October and November; 20 per cent in April and 10 per 
cent in September (Nix, 1998). 
 
Pre- and post-reform and analysis 
The available crops for the pre-reform and Agenda 2000 analysis are drawn from Table 3, for 
each of the 3 regions. The west Cambridgeshire farm type can grow combinable crops only. 
Field beans and oilseed rape are assumed to be winter sown (approximately 90 per cent of 
oilseed rape and 70 per cent of beans are winter sown in the UK (Nix, 2000)). In addition to 
these crops, the north Essex farm can grow and conserve grass to support beef production. 
The central Suffolk farm can grow all the previously described crops, grass and sugar beet 
and potatoes. Sugar beet production is set equal to available quota (below quota production is 
undesirable, as farmers lose quota entitlement in subsequent years), thus expansion of root 
crop area is assumed to take place through a change in potato area only. 
  
Two set-aside constraints are modelled: ‘restricted set-aside’, corresponding to the Agenda 
2000 requirement that 10 per cent of the area on which compensation is claimed be removed 
from production, and ‘variable set-aside’, with the set-aside area free to vary between 10 and 
50 per cent of the compensatable area. The maximum area of set-aside is constrained to be 
less than 50 per cent, because of the requirement that land voluntarily set-aside must not 
exceed the cropped area on which direct payments are claimed (Nix, 2000). Set-aside land 
can occur anywhere in the rotation and can act as a break crop for first winter wheat. 
 
6. Results and discussion 
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The optimal solution is given in terms of the farm net margin and associated resource, crop 
and animal allocations. Net margin is net of variable, labour (full-time, casual and contract) 
and machinery (owned and contract) costs of production. 
 
Pre-reform 
Under a one-break crop rotation with restricted set-aside, all farm types include the maximum 
possible area of oilseed rape (Table 4). Note that sugar beet and oilseed rape compete for the 
same land area, hence 19 per cent is the maximum area of oilseed rape for the central Suffolk 
farm. Winter cereals are favoured on the west Cambridgeshire farm; the north Essex farm, 
with its higher workrates and the central Suffolk farm, with competition for autumn labour 
and machinery from sugar beet, include a greater area of spring cereals. Integer levels of 
labour and tractors are the same for each farm; variation occurs in the amount of overtime, 
contract and casual hours used. Despite its small size, the north Essex farm uses a relatively 
large amount of overtime, a result of the slower workrates assumed for farms of less than 200 
hectares and lower field worktime availability on clay soils. 
Table 4 here 
Post-reform 
The assumed prices and subsidy levels under Agenda 2000 result in a range of farm net 
margin reductions: from 24 per cent on the central Suffolk farm under a two-break rotation, 
to 49 per cent on the north Essex farm under a one-break rotation and restricted set-aside 
(Table 5). Under the restricted set-aside, one-break crop rotation oilseed rape is eliminated on 
the west Cambridgeshire farm and reduced to 8 per cent on the north Essex farm: in both 
cases spring peas substitute for oilseed rape. On all farm types, the most profitable strategy is 
to shift to a two-break crop rotation whilst maintaining set-aside at 10 per cent. This strategy 
both increases the area of (high-yielding) first winter wheat and has the effect of maintaining 
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or increasing the area of oilseed rape relative to the pre-reform position. The incentive to use 
a two-break rotation increases on the clay-soil farms and falls on the loam-soil farm; in all 
cases the percentage reduction in net margin caused by not adopting the more intensive 
rotation increases under Agenda 2000 policy and assumed market prices. Accepting this 
financial penalty and following the recommended one-break rotation results in an increase in 
area of spring cereals on all farm types; on the higher workrate, clay-based north Essex farm, 
the one-break rotation is marginally improved by increasing the area of set-aside to 15 per 
cent. Where allowed, beef production or additional potatoes are not included under the 
Agenda 2000 scenario. 
Table 5 here 
Three conclusions can be drawn from this analysis. First, at the prices, direct payments and 
predicted yields assumed for each farm type, the ability to change set-aside and labour and 
machinery levels does not prevent farm net margins from falling substantially under the 
Agenda 2000 assumptions. Second, confirming a priori expectations, farms on heavy soils 
with reduced time available for cultivations and/or with field sizes that prevent ‘premium’ 
workrates from being achieved will be less able to adapt profitably to the reform scenario. 
Third, on two of the farm types, oilseed rape area declines when the farm is restricted to 
follow current agronomic advice by adopting a one-break rotation. However, the profit 
incentive to move away from accepted practice increases, resulting in similar or greater areas 
of oilseed rape than the pre-reform, one-break crop results. Thus, oilseed rape area will be 
maintained or may increase if farmers incorporate this incentive into their decision-making. 
 
Sensitivity analysis 
A range of oilseed rape gross margins were generated by varying the assumed rape price 
from £117 to £228 per tonne (note that due to differences in yield and variable cost, each of 
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the different farm types requires a different price to generate the equivalent gross margin). In 
addition, for the North Essex farm, a range of cereal gross margins were generated by varying 
assumed cereal price between £64 and £96 per tonne. These gross margins were run with the 
one- and two break models, with restricted and unrestricted set-aside and Agenda 2000 gross 
margins for other enterprises and set-aside. Results for the oilseed rape analysis are 
summarised in Figures 2-4. 
 
A relatively small reduction in oilseed rape price is necessary to reduce oilseed area on the 
west Cambridgeshire farm: with a one-break rotation, oilseed rape is eliminated from the 
solution at a gross margin of £672; this falls to £510 per hectare if a two-break rotation is 
allowed. These gross margins correspond to oilseed rape output prices of £204 per ton and 
£157 per ton respectively (Table 6; note that the assumed pre-reform price was £160 per ton). 
The reason for the generally low area of oilseed rape at these relatively high prices is the high 
gross margin for spring peas on this farm type - £703 per hectare, compared to £620 per 
hectare and £532 per hectare on the north Essex and central Suffolk farms respectively. 
Table 6 here 
The north Essex farm is the only farm type where set-aside area varies with oilseed rape 
gross margin, with, as would be expected, lower margins associated with greater levels of set-
aside and smaller areas of oilseed rape than with restricted set-aside. Oilseed rape area on this 
farm type drops below 8 per cent at a gross margin of £545 per hectare (£159 per ton) for all 
set-aside/rotation options except for one-break, restricted set-aside. This combined restriction 
excludes oilseed rape from the solution until gross margin reaches £681 per hectare (£199 per 
ton). 
 
Po
t-Print
Sensitivity analysis on the north Essex farm shows that oilseed rape area is relatively 
unresponsive to changes in cereal price. An increase from £64 to £73 per ton is sufficient to 
replace the area of peas with oilseed rape under the one-break rotation with restricted set-
aside; an increase to £76 per ton is required for the same change with one break crop and 
unrestricted set-aside. No further changes in oilseed area occur for these rotations within the 
price range considered (£64 to £96 per ton). Oilseed rape area is unaffected by cereal price 
under the two break crop rotation, with both restricted and unrestricted set-aside. Under the 
two-break rotation first winter wheat replaces half of the pea area at a price per ton of £66. 
These changes can be attributed to the larger gross margins of winter wheat: higher cereal 
prices favour higher yielding crops, leading to a substitution from spring to winter cropping. 
Note that higher cereal prices do not lead to lower oilseed rape area. 
 
The central Suffolk farm is the most robust to changing oilseed rape price - a gross margin of 
£510 per hectare, equating to an oilseed rape price of £140 per ton, is sufficient to induce the 
maximum area of oilseed rape possible under the one break rotation (19 per cent), assuming 
that the farm makes full use of its sugar-beet quota. 
 
The elimination of oilseed rape from the west Cambridgeshire farm at a relatively high gross 
margin is surprising, particularly as this farm has the greatest pre-reform area of oilseed rape 
(Table 2). As noted, this result partly reflects the relatively high gross margin for spring peas 
predicted on this farm. However, it is possible that this figure is not a true representation of 
what the average farmer could achieve in this region: the historical area of spring peas is 
relatively small in west Cambridgeshire and yields may reflect the expertise of a small 
number of specialist spring pea producers. 
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If we take the Essex farm type as being representative of the typical oilseed rape-producing 
farm, gross margins below £549 per hectare (£159/t), ceteris paribus, result in large 
reductions in oilseed rape area under the conventional one-break crop rotation. Assuming that 
1999 oilseed rape harvest prices (close to £100/t: HGCA, 1999b) persist into the 2001-2002 
marketing year, gross margins would fall to circa £320, £340 and £350 per hectare on the 
west Cambridgeshire, north Essex and central Suffolk farms respectively: levels at which 
oilseed rape area falls to zero under all the rotational and set-aside combinations considered 
in this paper.  
 
Approximate position of Figures 2-4 
7. Conclusions 
The CAP reforms agreed in March 1999 have continued the process started in 1992, but still 
maintain a price margin between EU and world markets for most products. The decision to 
re-balance support between cereals and oilseeds within the arable regime has, however, 
removed from the EU a constraint on oilseed production dating from the 1994 Uruguay 
Round Agreement. Re-balancing will strengthen the hand of the EU in the next WTO round 
of multilateral trade negotiations, in particular by enabling the EU to defend its oilseed 
production better. The decision that keeps some EU cereal intervention prices above world 
levels will, however, leave it vulnerable to attack regarding the continued use of export 
refunds. 
 
One consequence of the arable sector re-balancing is that the level of support granted to 
oilseed production is much reduced. Model results for the west Cambridgeshire and north 
Essex farms suggest that oilseed rape area would fall if farmers maintained conventional one-
break crop rotations. Analysis of oilseed rape gross margins for the three farm types suggests 
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that oilseed rape area under a conventional rotation is relatively sensitive to changes in gross 
margin, particularly if set-aside area is allowed to increase above 10 per cent, cereal prices 
are at intervention levels and where competing break crops such as spring peas have 
relatively favourable gross margins. Where alternative break crops perform less well (north 
Essex) or compete with existing spring-sown crops (sugar beet, central Suffolk) oilseed rape 
maintains its position in the rotation at lower prices These findings hold under higher cereal 
prices: within a realistic range, higher cereal prices do not lead to substitution of cereals for 
oilseed rape; indeed higher cereal prices tend to increase the area of oilseed rape relative to 
other break crops.  
 
Agenda 2000 has increased the incentive for farmers to abandon standard agronomic practice 
and plant break crops more frequently: if this shift in farming practice occurs the results 
suggest that oilseed rape areas will remain at levels similar to pre-Agenda 2000 areas at 
prices between £133 and £177 per ton, depending on farm type. This incentive to move to 
two-break rotations has been exacerbated by the general shift of policy mechanisms away 
from end-price support to area subsidies: output penalties resulting from more frequent 
cropping are substantially less when between 30 and 50 per cent of break crop output value is 
in the form of area payments.  
 
Although beyond the scope of this paper, the lack of scope for adaptation through changing 
enterprise or resource mix and the resulting fall in farm profitability between the pre- and 
post-reform scenarios is likely to lead to changes in farm structure as farmers choose, or are 
forced, to move out of the industry. This will lead to an increase in the average size of farms 
growing combinable crops. The implications for other oilseed producing EU countries are 
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also worthy of further research, with Germany and France (oilseed rape) and Spain, France 
and Italy (sunflowers) being major producers.  
 
In conclusion, the analysis presented here suggests that under full implementation of the 
Agenda 2000 agreement, at an exchange rate of £0.629 to the euro and an oilseed rape price 
of £160 per ton, area of oilseed rape grown on east of England combinable crop farms will 
decline where competing break crops exist and where farms are not already growing spring-
sown root crops such as sugar beet. In the UK, Agenda 2000, together with poor market 
conditions for cereals, increases the importance of break crops generally relative to cereal 
crops, providing farmers with an additional incentive to increase the area of break crops in a 
rotation. Where this occurs, oilseed rape area will be maintained at lower prices than if 
farmers choose to follow conventional agronomic practice. However, if world prices for 
oilseeds continue at 1999/2000 levels and cereal prices remain low, we can expect substantial 
reductions in the area of oilseed rape grown in the east of England, particularly if farmers are 
allowed to set aside more than 10 per cent of the land on which they claim direct payments. 
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Table 1. Regional production of oilseed rape in England (1997) 
 
Region 
Total No. 
of 
holdings
No. of 
holdings 
with OSR
Total 
agricultur
alarea in 
each 
region 
(‘000 ha.)
Area of 
OSR in 
each 
region 
(‘000 ha.) 
% of total 
agricultur
al area 
cropped 
with OSR 
North East 5178 1017 24 1.5 6.4 
North West 17397 225 4 0.04 1.1 
Yorkshire and 
Humberside 
16042 2372 50 6.7 13.3 
East Midlands 15799 2988 92 22.2 24.1 
West Midlands 18871 1118 27 1.9 7.0 
East Anglia 17326 2539 82 17.7 21.6 
South East 18161 1876 69 12.5 18.1 
South West 35603 1196 33 2.8 8.5 
 
OSR = Oilseed Rape 
Source: MAFF, 1998. 
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Table 2. Cropping characteristics of farms in the East Anglia Farm Business Survey, 1998/99 
 
Region 
Cereals Legumes
†
Potatoes 
& sugar 
beet
Oilseed 
rape
Set-
aside 
Forage 
area ‡
Other †† Area 
available 
for arable 
cropping
Soil type No of 
Farms in 
the 
survey
 Percentage of total farm area Hectares
West Cambridgeshire 55.4 5.6 0.8 18.4 4.7 10.1 5.8 210 Clay 34
South Cambridgeshire and 
Hertfordshire 
61.9 7.7 1.4 11.1 5.3 6.6 7.7  Chalk 30
North Essex & south west 
Suffolk 
58.1 4.8 3.9 10.1 4.4 11.4 8.4 188 Clay 48
South Essex 61.2 7.6 0 9.7 6.4 9.9 5.8  Clay 28
Central Suffolk 57.7 3.1 6.2 7.8 3.5 11.2 11.0 224 Loam 45
South east Lincolnshire 53.0 6.1 14.5 5.1 3.6 4.9 14.8 Silt 26
‘Breckland’ 38.6 1.4 17.0 1.8 4.7 23.6 14.3 Sand 18
Central Norfolk 53.7 2.0 17.1 1.7 3.6 14.5 8.2 Loam 59
North Cambridge Fen 50.4 6.9 25.0 1.3 3.6 6.0 6.9 Peat 28
 
†  Includes field peas and beans, but excludes vining peas. 
‡  Includes land let to other farmers. 
††  Horticultural crops, orchards and fruit crops, vining peas, seed crops, other cash crops, buildings and roads. 
 Percentage figures may sum to more than 100 due to double cropping. 
 Source: Lang, 2000.
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Table 3. Pre- and post-reform crop gross margins 
 
 
 
West 
Cambridgeshire 
 
North Essex 
 
Central Suffolk 
Year 1996-98 2002 1996-98 2002 1996-98 2002
 £ / ha. 
Winter wheat 751 517 741 521 682 515
Spring barley† 545 447 698 455 608 450
Winter barley 669 475 660 446 629 484
Field beans‡ 615 539 643 567 604 528
Spring field peas 728 703 670 620 589 532
Oilseed rape‡ 733 620 739 630 713 624
Potatoes n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1209 1524
Sugar beet n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1266 1399
Set-aside 291 218 291 218 291 218
 
All figures adjusted to 1998 values before averaging 
† No distinction made between feed and malting varieties 
‡ No distinction made between spring and winter varieties 
†† After deducting £15 per hectare variable costs 
n.a.  Not available as an option in the model for this farm location 
 
Source: Murphy (1998,1999), Lang (2000), Nix (1996); authors’ estimates (see text).  
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 Table 4. Pre-reform results 
 
 
West 
Cambridgeshire
North 
Essex 
Central Suffolk 
 1998 10% set-aside, 1 break crop 
Farm size (hectares) 210 188 224 
Net margin (£) 77,813 71,962 73,023 
 % cropped area % cropped area % cropped area 
First winter wheat 35 35 28 
Second winter wheat 10 0 0 
Spring barley 0 17 20 
Winter barley 20 13 18 
Total cereals 65 65 66 
Oilseed rape 25 25 19 
Set-aside 10 10 9 
Sugar beet n.a. n.a. 6 
Total 100 100 100 
    
Farmer (number) † 1 1 1 
Hired labour (number) 
‡ 
1 1 1 
Tractors (number) 2 2 2 
Overtime (hours) 292 334 195 
Contract (hours) 0 0 17.5 
Casual (hours) 35 0 0 
Two-break incentive 
(£)†† 
5,479 (7%) 2,269 (3%) 7,292 (10%) 
 
Note Field beans, spring peas and grassland for beef were not included in any of the 
optimal solutions 
† Hired labourer supplies 1762 hours per year (adjusted by weekly available field time) 
 ‡ Farmer supplies one third of the field time supplied by one hired labourer 
†† Optimal farm net margin under the two-break crop rotation less optimal farm net 
margin under the one-break crop rotation; pre-reform gross margins. Percentage figure is 
the increase from the one-break rotation farm net margin. 
n.a. Enterprise not available for this farm type. 
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Table 5. Post-reform results 
 West Cambridgeshire North Essex Central Suffolk 
 
Category 
2002 
10% set-
aside 
1 break 
crop 
2002 
10% set-
aside 
2 break 
crops 
2002 
10-50% 
set-aside
1 break 
crop 
2002 
10% set-
aside 
1 break 
crop 
2002 
10% set-
aside 
2 break 
crops 
2002 
10-50% 
set-aside
1 break 
crop 
2002 
10% set-
aside 
1 break 
crop 
2002 
10% set-
aside 
2 break 
crops 
2002 
10-50% 
set-aside 
1 break 
crop 
Net margin (£) 44,030 51,789 42,501 36,976 42,795 37,842 49,816 55,467 49,816 
% fall in net margin (from 
1998) 
45 33 45 49 41 47 32 24 32 
 % 
First winter wheat 35 40 35 35 40 36 28 25 28 
Spring barley 15 0 15 23 0 16 26 16 26 
Winter barley 15 0 15 7 0 7 12 0 12 
Total cereals 65 40 65 65 40 60 66 41 66 
Spring peas 25 28 0 17 14 17 0 0 0 
Oilseed rape 0 22 25 8 36 8 19 44 19 
Set-aside 10 10 10 10 10 15 9 9 9 
Sugar beet n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 6 6 6 
Farmer (number) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Hired labour (number 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Tractors 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Overtime (hrs.) 266 308 266 238 360 237 194 252 194 
Contract (hrs.) 0 0 0 30.5 29.5 0 17.5 17.5 17.5 
Casual (hrs.) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7.3 0 
Two-break incentive (£) 9,288 (22%) 5,822 (16%) 5,651 (11%) 
Note Field beans, second and third winter wheat, potatoes and grassland for beef were not included in any of the optimal 
solutions. Other definitions are as in Table 4. 
† Optimal farm net margin under the two-break crop rotation less optimal farm net margin under the one-break crop rotation; 
post-reform gross margins. Percentage figure is the increase from the one-break rotation farm net margin. 
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Table 6: Price (£ / tonne) at which oilseed rape is eliminated from the optimal solution 
 West 
Cambridgeshire 
North Essex Central Suffolk 
1 break crop rotation 204 118 137 
2 break crop rotation 157 118 131 
1 break crop, unrestricted set-aside 204 199 137 
2 break crops, unrestricted set-aside 157 142 131 
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